Does Gentrification Lower Crime: A Look at Granger-Casuality in Washington, D.C. by Lawrence, Will, \u2713
The Park Place Economist
Volume 21 | Issue 1 Article 15
2013
Does Gentrification Lower Crime: A Look at
Granger-Casuality in Washington, D.C.
Will Lawrence '13
Illinois Wesleyan University, dlawrenc@iwu.edu
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by The Ames Library, the Andrew W. Mellon Center for Curricular and Faculty
Development, the Office of the Provost and the Office of the President. It has been accepted for inclusion in Digital Commons @ IWU by
the faculty at Illinois Wesleyan University. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@iwu.edu.
©Copyright is owned by the author of this document.
Recommended Citation
Lawrence, Will '13 (2013) "Does Gentrification Lower Crime: A Look at Granger-Casuality
in Washington, D.C.," The Park Place Economist: Vol. 21
Available at: http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/parkplace/vol21/iss1/15
Does Gentrification Lower Crime: A Look at Granger-Casuality in
Washington, D.C.
Abstract
This project looks at the relationship between gentrification and violent crime rates, specifically in
Washington, DC. Gentrification is a social phenomenon that involves middle and upper class residents
moving into the city center where violent crime had previously acted as a barrier for keeping unwanted
demographics out. An increase in demand for housing by the higher income residents drives up the cost of
housing which, in turn, forces out the lower income residents. Higher income residents generally have lower
crime rates, so the crime rate falls as the lower income residents with higher crime rates move. This, however,
is all theory. This study explores whether crime rates fall as a result of these upper income families moving in
or if the drop in crime is one more reason the upper income residents want to move.
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I.INTRODUCTION
Driving through Washington, D.C. today is 
noticeably different from twenty years ago. In the 
1980s and early 1990s, the crack epidemic took hold of 
Washington D.C. and in 1991, the murder rate peaked 
at 479 deaths (NBC4 Washington, 2011). Since then, 
crime has plummeted and investment in the poverty-
stricken areas is on the rise. According to the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, from 1995 until 2010, the 
violent crime rate in Washington, D.C. fell by more 
than half from 2,661.4 per 100,000 individuals in 1995 
to 1,330.2 per 100,000 in 2010 (FBI, 1995, 2011). 
During that same timeframe, the median housing price 
(2010 $) rose three-fold from $176,000 to $528,000 
(NeighborhoodInfo DC, 2011). These astonishing 
changes are not a mere coincidence. There is a definite 
social phenomenon called ‘gentrification’ occurring in 
the nation’s capital.  
This project looks at the relationship between 
gentrification and violent crime rates, specifically in 
Washington, DC. Gentrification is a social phenomenon 
that involves middle and upper class residents 
moving into the city center where violent crime had 
previously acted as a barrier for keeping unwanted 
demographics out. An increase in demand for housing 
by the higher income residents drives up the cost of 
housing which, in turn, forces out the lower income 
residents. Higher income residents generally have 
lower crime rates, so the crime rate falls as the lower 
income residents with higher crime rates move. This, 
however, is all theory. This study explores whether 
crime rates fall as a result of these upper income 
families moving in or if the drop in crime is one more 
reason the upper income residents want to move.
II. THEORY & LITERATURE REVIEW
As gentrification is a pressing phenomenon, 
large amounts of literature have been devoted to it, and 
more specifically, its relationship with crime. McDonald 
(1986) provides somewhat of a literature review, albeit 
a dated one, of the competing theories regarding the 
effects of gentrification. McDonald (1986) characterizes 
gentrification as “the apparent revitalization of central 
city private housing markets”. An important distinction 
that must be made in that definition is the existence of 
a population shift. Simply upgrading the housing supply 
by long-term residents does not qualify as gentrification. 
There has to be a movement of middle and upper-class 
people into what was formerly a predominately lower-
class neighborhood.  
While it may seem that this ‘revitalization’ will 
be a positive influence on neighborhoods, the theory 
is not so cut-and-dry. In Fairmount, a neighborhood of 
Philadelphia that previously had strong ethnic bonds, 
upper class residents with different cultural norms moved 
in and led to direct conflict escalating into violence with 
the lower class, long-term residents (McDonald, 1986, 
p. 167). That being said, this is usually rare because of 
how strong the ethnic and cultural bonds need to be. 
A potpourri of different cultures living together simply 
because of lower housing costs is not enough for this 
to occur. Rather, it is more in line with the districts of 
Chinatown and Little Italy in New York City.
McDonald (1986) outlines five potential 
reasons why crime rates drop with gentrification and 
four potential reasons why they might rise, along with 
one reason why it might stay stagnate. The reasons they 
might drop are as follows: (1) affluent neighborhoods 
have, on average, less crime than impoverished 
neighborhoods, (2) revitalization at the hands of the 
new residents can “pull up” instead of “push out” the 
former residents, (3) new residents are more cognizant 
of the crime problem and establish initiatives to combat 
crime, for example, the neighborhood watch, (4) 
affluent residents usually have more political influence 
which leads to more funding devoted to the police 
department, more stringent stances on crime, etc., and 
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(5) the displacement of the poor residents can lead to 
the individuals responsible for committing the crimes 
to be displaced. Reason five is what gets at the heart 
of gentrification and is directly related to, if not the 
cause of, reason one. Reasons two, three, and four are 
periphery causes of the drop in crime, at least in the 
context of a model of gentrification.
On the other hand, McDonald (1986) also 
gives several reasons why gentrification might not 
lead to a decrease in crime: (1) when individuals are 
displaced, they may only be displaced to adjacent blocks 
or neighborhoods which hardly prevents them from 
committing crime in their old neighborhood, especially 
with an influx of attractive targets, (2) if gentrification is 
drawn out over a long period of time, there will be a very 
apparent income-gap between residents which suggests 
an increase in violent crime, (3) gentrification in ‘cohesive 
ethnic neighborhoods’ rather than ‘disorganized ghetto 
neighborhoods’ may lead to the breakdown of natural 
order in the communities, (4) gentrification can cause 
community conflicts which, on some occasions, results 
in criminal activity, and (5) it may not have any effect at 
all.  Most of these theorized effects occur at the onset 
of gentrification. As time goes on, it appears that the 
end-result of a fully gentrified neighborhood will have 
lower crime rates.
Much research use case-studies to look at 
individual neighborhoods (McDonald, 1986; O’Sullivan, 
2005; Kreager et al, 2011). This paper is different in that 
it examines the city-wide effect of gentrification. By 
using data from every neighborhood in a city, regression 
analysis can be employed to explore the effects of 
gentrification. Unfortunately, by not focusing on specific 
neighborhoods, this paper cannot examine the specific 
reasons gentrification affects crime rates.  Instead, it 
will focus on the gentrification process as it permeates 
throughout a city.
This paper employs location theory to look at 
the general effects of gentrification on crime. Location 
theory states that in a completely un-gentrified city, the 
city center is high in crime with a low income residential 
population while the suburbs around the city with low 
crime rates are populated by higher income people 
who commute into the city. O’Sullivan’s (2005) model 
of location theory holds that as the cost of travel into 
the city center goes up and the cost of security in the 
city center goes down, the higher income people will 
move into the center of the city to take advantage of 
the cheap housing and low travel costs. As the higher 
income population moves in, they push out the lower 
income population and the crime rate should fall 
further due to a variety of factors that McDonald 
covered previously. The lower income population gets 
pushed out because while they also value the low 
travel expenses that are a result of living close to the 
center of the city, the higher income population is able 
to outbid the lower income population in order to 
take advantage of the convenience. The lower income 
population will be pushed out, starting from the center, 
to the edges of the city. Once the gentrification process 
is complete, they will ultimately move elsewhere. Rising 
travel costs for the upper income population in addition 
to less crime in the center of the city, based on location 
theory’s explanation of gentrification, will ultimately lead 
to higher housing costs and a further reduction of crime.
A Granger-causality Test is used in order to 
examine the relationship between gentrification and 
crime. A Granger Test attempts to show causality 
between two variables, although it is closer to an 
inference than a conclusive finding. The idea behind 
the Granger Test is that if an independent variable ‘X’ 
combined with lags for a dependent variable can give a 
better estimate of the dependant variable ‘Y’ than just 
the lags, X is said to have ‘Granger-caused’ Y. Specifics of 
running the test will further be explored in the outline 
of the empirical model.
The hypothesis states that gentrification will 
Granger-cause crime rates to go down, at least in 
Washington, D.C, but crime rates will not Granger-
cause gentrification. While location theory holds that 
both the crime rates are going down as well as travel 
costs are going up which causes gentrification, this 
study examines if D.C. is a unique case. Washington, 
D.C. has the second worst traffic among US cities 
(Weather.com). Washington D.C. is a high commuter 
city with the limited upper class neighborhood options 
concentrated in a very small area. A large population 
works in Washington D.C. but commutes every day, as 
evidenced by the fact that the population of Washington 
D.C. almost doubles during the workday according to 
the 2000 Census. This study, therefore, has important 
policy implications for the city of Washington D.C. If 
gentrification is a socially desirable outcome, it would 
be beneficial for the government in Washington D.C. 
to allow travel costs to rise to encourage gentrification. 
On the other hand, if gentrification is undesirable, it 
would be more efficient to subsidize travel so that the 
upper income population stays in the suburbs and does 
not displace the lower income population in the city.
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In the context of this study, it is possible for crime 
to Granger-cause gentrification just as gentrification 
Granger-causes crime. If this occurs, this study will be 
forced to conclude that the two variables are working 
simultaneously and the causal factors cannot be brought 
out. If neither gentrification nor crime Granger-cause 
the other, then the two variables are unrelated.
III. DATA
This study uses data directly from the 
Metropolitan Police Department’s (MPD) Research and 
Analysis Branch.  Washington D.C. has several different 
divisions including quadrants (NW, SE, etc.), wards (1-
8), police districts (1-7), and police service areas (PSAs) 
(within each police district).  Quadrants, police districts, 
and wards are all too large areas to approximate the 
effect of individual neighborhoods. Another problem 
is there are not enough data points to get significant 
results. Even with wards, 8 wards and 6 years (2004-
2010) only yield 48 observations. Because of the 
Granger-causality Test, lagging variables take even more 
observations away. Therefore, this study uses PSAs, both 
to combat a small sample size and to attempt to get 
at neighborhood differences. Ideally, this study would 
examine data going back to 1995, or when the crack 
epidemic of the late 1980s and early 1990s was winding 
down.  Unfortunately, MPD was not comfortable 
releasing data prior to 2004 due to reporting and 
geographic inconsistencies. In order to get the prior 
data, a FOIA request is necessary, which leads to a 
natural continuation of this research. Going back to only 
2004 will yield a large enough sample size to conduct 
a regression analysis, but it is unlikely to show as strong 
of a correlation between crime and gentrification. 
Because gentrification is a process, only six years 
might not be enough to show the process happening.
This study also uses data from a website called 
NeighborhoodInfoDC.com which is a source that pulls 
together data from a variety of sources including the DC 
Department of Human Services and the D.C. Office of 
Tax and Revenue’s Real Property Tax Administration’s 
real property database. From this website, the average 
property values as well as Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families (TANF) for each individual PSA will 
be used.  Property values are used as a proxy for one 
side of gentrification: the upper class residents moving 
in. TANF will be used as a proxy for the other side 
of gentrification: the lower classes moving out. TANF 
is a means-tested government subsidy so the more 
individuals receiving TANF implies that there is a higher 
population of poor people. If gentrification is occurring, 
an increase in housing prices, accompanied with a fall 
in individuals receiving TANF, will show that crime rates 
are falling.
In 2004, Washington, D.C. redrew the lines 
for the Police Service Areas. Unfortunately, the data 
from the Metropolitan Police Department were 
coded for the post-2004 PSAs while the data from 
NeighborhoodInfoDC.com were coded for the pre-
2004 PSAs. While this certainly detracts from the 
credibility of the data, it does not completely undermine 
the study. The police districts have not changed. So 
while the districts may have been slightly different, the 
neighborhoods still have much overlap. The biggest issue 
is that in the redistricting, two new PSAs were created. 
Because this study cannot accurately redistribute the 
crime data from the new PSAs to the old ones, those 
data points have been omitted. Due to the same overall 
police districts and the two omitted PSAs, there should 
not be significant errors in the analysis.
Due to the limited scope of this project, the effect 
of traffic will not be examined. While it is an important 
effect with regards to location theory, the other half 
of the location theory still warrants a treatment. An 
increase in housing prices implies that there is a higher 
demand for houses in neighborhoods with high crime 
rates, which accounts for the gentrification. In addition, 
looking at the effects of gentrification (the smaller 
number of lower income people proxied by the TANF 
measure) can also be fruitful.  A continuation of this paper 
would incorporate traffic and attempt to show that 
traffic Granger-causes gentrification, although the exact 
method for conducting that test is not overtly apparent.
IV. EMPRICIAL MODEL
The empirical model in this paper follows the 
Granger-causality Test. Two separate Granger-causality 
tests will be run: one with housing as the independent 
variable and the other with TANF as the independent 
variable. To begin, an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regression is run to see the correlation between the 
dependent variable (crime) and the independent 
variables (housing or poverty), as well as a variable for 
lagged crime. The number of violent crimes related 
to the city-wide mean will be CRIME. HOUSE is the 
median house price for the individual PSA. TANF is the 
number of individuals receiving the subsidy as related to 
the city-wide mean. This takes the following form:
CRIME = ß0 + ß1HOUSE + ß2CRIMEt-1
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Next, the variable ‘HOUSE’ is removed yielding the 
following equation:
CRIME = ß0 + ß1CRIMEt-1
Finally, a Wald test is done between the two regressions. 
The first equation with housing included is the 
unrestricted model. The second model with the HOUSE 
variable omitted is the restricted model. An F-test is 
then run to determine if the omission of HOUSE had a 
statistically significant effect on the prediction of CRIME. 
The F-statistic is as follows:
F = (ESSR – ESSU)/(DFR – DFU)
ESSU/DFU
Where ESS is the Error Sum of Squares for the 
respective restricted and unrestricted models and DF 
is the Degrees of Freedom for the respective restricted 
and unrestricted models. If the F-test is significant, then 
it can be said that HOUSE ‘Granger-caused’ CRIME. 
The test then needs to be run again to 
determine if CRIME ‘Granger-causes’ HOUSE. It will 
look exactly the same as the first Granger-causality Test 
except the initial setup will look as follows:
HOUSE = ß0 + ß1CRIME + ß2HOUSEt-1
HOUSE = ß0 + ß1HOUSEt-1
The F-test is then run to determine if CRIME ‘Granger-
caused’ HOUSE. The hypothesis is HOUSE will 
‘Granger-cause’ CRIME to fall but CRIME will have no 
effect on HOUSE in terms of Granger-causality. This is 
in accordance with the location theory as previously 
articulated.
The previous test is then run again with 
the variable TANF in place of the variable HOUSE. 
Equations 1 to5 are followed and the methodology is 
exactly the same.
V. RESULTS
In order to simplify the Granger-causality Tests, 
only one variable at a time is introduced . This results in 
two separate Granger Tests, one for housing prices and 
the other for TANF. These two tests get at both sides 
of the gentrification process: the former is a proxy for 
the upper income residents moving in and the latter is a 
proxy for the lower income residents moving out.
To start, two regressions are run: the first 
regression is HOUSE on CRIME and the second 
regression is TANF on CRIME. This is done to check 
both the coefficients and the signs. As a Granger Test 
only examines Granger-causality, the coefficients and 
signs are irrelevant. Table 1 shows the first regression 
with HOUSE is significant at the .01 level, has the 
correct sign, and a coefficient of -.287. Table 2 shows the 
second regression with TANF also is significant at the 
.01 level, has the correct sign, and a coefficient of .150. 
The reason for running the two regressions separately 
was that the variables have high multicollinearity. Since 
both housing prices and TANF numbers are directly 
related (lower income residents have lower housing 
prices), including both HOUSE and TANF in the same 
regression with crime is not productive.
Table 3 shows the first Granger Test examined, 
CRIME and HOUSE. As previously explained, HOUSE 
and CRIMEt-1 are regressed on CRIME in the unrestricted 
model. Then,   CRIMEt-1 is regressed on CRIME in the 
restricted model. The resulting F-value comparing the 
restricted and the unrestricted models is 39.94 which 
is statistically significant at the .01 level. Next, CRIME 
and HOUSEt-1 are regressed on HOUSE. Then, CRIME 
is taken out and HOUSEt-1 is regressed on HOUSE. 
The resulting F-value is 102.68, which is also statistically 
significant at the .01 level. From these results, HOUSE 
Granger-causes CRIME and CRIME Granger-causes 
HOUSE.
Table 4 shows the second Granger Test 
which repeats the above test, this time examining the 
relationship between TANF and CRIME. The unrestricted 
model involves regressing TANF and CRIMEt-1 on CRIME 
while the unrestricted model excludes TANF and only 
has a regression of CRIMEt-1 on CRIME. The resulting 
F-value was 36.6, which is statistically significant at the 
.01 level. The process is then reversed with CRIME and 
TANFt-1 having a regression on TANF in the unrestricted 
model. CRIME is then excluded from the restricted 
model and the resulting F-value was 6.3, which due to 
the high sample size is significant at the .01 level. From 
this, it can be shown that TANF Granger-causes CRIME 
and CRIME Granger-causes TANF.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
From the results, the effects of gentrification can 
clearly be seen. The individual regressions show that an 
increase in housing price and a decrease in the number 
of poor people will each lead to a decrease in crime. 
That being said, the goal of this project is not to merely 
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note the existence of gentrification. Rather, it is to show 
a potential causal relationship between the proxies for 
gentrification and the effects of the gentrification.
The two Granger Tests yielded the same result: 
both examined variables Granger-caused the other. This 
essentially means that the variables influence each other, 
preventing any causal conclusions from being drawn. 
While there is no one way Granger-causality, these 
results still allow some inferences to be made.
It is worth looking at the TANF Granger Test 
a little more closely. The F-statistic for the first half of 
the Granger Test to determine if TANF Granger-causes 
CRIME was 36.6, which is statistically significant at the 
.01 level. The F-statistic for the second half of the test 
was merely 6.3, but is also statistically significant at the 
.01 level due to the large sample size. Because the F-test 
is designed to examine the difference between two 
regressions, the large difference in magnitude between 
the two F-statistics may lead one to believe that there is 
a difference. While conclusions cannot be drawn given 
that they are both statistically significant, it appears that 
TANF may Granger-cause CRIME to a higher degree 
than CRIME Granger-causes TANF.
One possible reason why no conclusive 
Granger-causality results were drawn is that the data 
only went back to 2005. Because the Metropolitan Police 
Department did not grant access to earlier data, the 
entire process of gentrification could not be examined. 
One important aspect of gentrification on a city-wide 
level is that it is an ongoing process. In Washington, 
D.C., the process started in the early 1990s with the 
end of the crack epidemic. Without including almost a 
decade’s worth of data, it is hardly a surprise that the 
results are not exactly what are expected.  Once the 
entire gentrification process is contained in the data, the 
results might be more in line with what is hypothesized.
Even without Granger-causality one way or the 
other, this study still has merit. In short, it served as a 
confirmation of one side of location theory. A fall in 
crime rates does lead to the occurrence of gentrification. 
While the traffic side has not been accounted for, it is an 
area for additional research. Washington, D.C., at least 
according to the results in this study, is simply another 
example of location theory at work.
Unfortunately, without any Granger-causality 
to build from (aside from the weak inference with 
the TANF results), it is not as easy to make policy 
implications. That being said, this information can be 
useful for city planning. If gentrification is a desired 
outcome, governments should allow traffic costs to rise 
(assuming the traffic side of location theory still holds) 
as well as combating crime in the inner-city. This brings 
up an entirely new debate, however, about whether or 
not gentrification is, in fact, desired. There is a difference 
between pushing lower income people out and pulling 
them up into a better social standing. It appears that 
gentrification is guilty of the former, although this area 
deserves more research. If this is the case, it is difficult 
to see gentrification as anything more than a geographic 
redistribution of the indigent; a hardly desirable outcome 
when it comes to social justice.
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VIII. APPENDIX
Table 1: Preliminary Housing Regresion 
Vairable Explanation Coefficient Significance 
Dependent Variable 
CRIME Number of crimes in a given year
Independent Variable 
HOUSE Median house sale for a given year -.287 -.2900(***)
Adjusted R2 .030 Sample Size 243
Table 2: Preliminary Temporary Assistance for Needy Families Regression
Variable Explanation Coefficicent Significance 
Dependent Variable 
CRIME Number of total crimes in a given year 
Independent Variable 
TANF Number of individuals receiving Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families 
.150 6.627(***)
Adjusted R2 .143 Sample Size 257
Table 3: HOUSE Granger Test
Variable Unrestricted Restricted
HOUSE -.009 (-.396)
CRIMEt-1 .974 (64.971)*** .975 (71.994)***
Error Sum of Squares 1632386 1953531
Sample Size 206 257
F-Statistic 39.94***
CRIME -.012 (-1.346)
HOUSEt-1 .966 (64.014)*** .959 (58.928)***
Error Sum of Squares 598383 907136
Sample Size 201 207
F-Statistic 102.68***
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Table 4: TANF Granger Test
Variable Unrestricted Restricted
TANF .013 (2.230)**
CRIMEt-1 .964 (64.240)*** .975 (71.994)***
Error Sum of Squares 1673740 1953531
Sample Size 220 257
F-Statistic 36.6***
CRIME -.043 (-2.460)**
TANFt-1 .999 (144.045)*** .993 (160.756)***
Error Sum of Squares 2071699 2132402
Sample Size 215 224
F-Statistic 6.3***
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